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In the 
Supreme Cow1 of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTER-
EST 
of 
CHARL YNE FRANCIS MITCHELL, 
Minor. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9003 
As used in this brief, unless. otherwise indicated, the 
term (THE COURT) refers to The First District Juvenile 
Court of Weber County, Utah: the initial (R) refers to the 
Record on Appeal; the initial (T) refers to the Transcript 
of the testimony, and the initials (CR) refer to the Confi-
dential Reports. 
Shirley Mitchell Holland is a young woman that lived 
in Ogden, Utah, who had three children, two girls and a 
boy, all apparently born out of wedlock. The boy is with 
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its father in the State of Pennsylvania and is not involved 
in this proceeding. The two girls, Sharon, age 6, and 
Charlyne Francis, age 5, were kept by the mother in Ogden. 
!n June, 1957 Sharon was brought under the jurisdiction 
of the Court and placed under the supervision of the W el-
fare Department but custody remained with the mother. 
In January or February, 1956, the mother gave Char-
lyne to John Stelly and his wife, Berth, ostensibly for the 
purpose of adoption. The Stellys did not adopt Charlyne, as 
will .more fully appear in this brief. 
On July 25th, 1958 a Probation Officer filed Petitions 
with the Court, R-7 and R-22, alleging that these girls were 
neglected children and praying that they be placed for 
adoption. Notice was served on all interested parties and 
hearings were held, commencing August 26, 1958 and con-
cluded December lOth, 1958.· At the conclusion of these 
hearings the court dismissed the petition as to Sharon and 
returned her to the custody of her mother, but found the 
mother unfit to have the custody of Charlyne and awarded 
her to the custody of the Stellys for the purpose of adoption. 
To reverse the ruling in regard to Charlyne, the mother 
and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Coy Pruitt, prosecute this 
appeal and make the following assignment of errors: 
1. Misconduct of the Welfare Officers by which ap-
pellants were prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Error of the Court in assuming jurisdiction over 
these children. 
3. Error of the Court in depriving the mother of cus-
. tody of Charlyne Francis. 
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4. Error of the Court in awarding custody of said 
~hild to John Stelly and his wife, Berth Stelly, with the 
right of adoption. 
To sustain this appeal and reverse the trial Court, 
appellants rely on the following: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON 
THE JUVENILE COURT. 
POINT II. 
THEJUDGMENTISCONTRARYTOTHEEV~ 
DENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON 
THE JUVENILE COURT. 
State in Interest of Johnson, 175 P. 2nd 486; 
Label vs. Sullivan, 165 S. W. 2nd 639; 
State in Interest of Graham, 170 P. 2nd 172; 
In Re Cranjaeger, 140 N. E. 2nd 773. 
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In construing our statutes conferring jurisdiction on 
Juvenile Courts to protect children, this Court in the John-
son case, at page 490, Pacific citation, said: 
"We recognize of course that there may be cir-
cumstances where a failure to take control of a child 
may do the child immediate injustice, such as con-
templated in the statute. Under such circumstances 
the juvenile authorities should act swiftly and effec-
tively. 
"Our juvenile court procedure is sufficiently 
flexible to protect a child in an emergency against 
ill treatment, abuse, or injury to health or morals-
where immediate and summary action is required. 
(Statute quoted.) 
"However, throughout the juvenile code repeated 
warnings are given as to the preferential rights of 
the natural parent, and of course these emergency 
provisions are not intended as a convenient vehicle 
for nullifying that preference. This was not an 
emergency case. It was nothing more than an effort 
to show that the mother of the child was not a suit-
able or proper person to have the custody of her 
child-an issue that could have been tried in the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings without re-
sort to the emergency proceedings such as were taken 
here. The petition alleges no fact of an emergency 
nature." 
Label vs. Sullivan is a Missouri case wherein it is said: 
"In order to justify committing minors to char-
itable institutions because of neglect of its parents 
as alleged in the complaint means that parent had 
failed to provide for children in such manner and to 
such extent as to make him a neglected child within 
the statute, that is, destitute or dependent on the 
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public for support, so as to give Juvenile Court jur-
isdiction of a cause which would not be supplied be 
entendment where the Court's findings were broader 
than the statute." 
In New Hampshire the rule is stated as follows: 
"The jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is lim-
ited to neglected and dependent children, a neglected 
child being one who is abandoned by his parents, who 
habitually begs or receives alms, who is found in any 
disreputable place; associates with disreputable per-
sons ; engages in an occupation or is in such sur-
roundings as may prove injurious to the child's phys-
ical, mental or moral well being." Label vs. Sullivan, 
supra. 
In Ohio the rule is stated with this language: 
"Where a mother of minors was confined to 
state hospital because of mental illness, and during 
her confinement she had no funds with which to 
support her children and was unaware of their 
whereabouts, she was not guilty of wilfull neglect 
and the children did not come within the statutory 
definition of a neglected child whose custody could 
be awarded to the Child Welfare Board." Re, Gran-
jaeger, supra. 
No such state of affairs is alleged in the case at bar. 
Now, let's examine the petition in this cause R-22; It 
alleges; (1) that the parents are not married. This does not 
bring the child within our statute. (2) The father aban-
doned the mother and child. Nor does this. (3) The mother 
placed the child with John Stelly. This is an allegation of 
care, not neglect. ( 4) The mother had not provided any 
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support. Here there is no allegation of wilfullness. or ability 
on the part of the mother. There is no allegation of emer-
gency, on the part of the child, such as suggested by the de-
cisions. cited herein. The Record shows affirmatively that 
the child, as a matter of fact, was well cared for and no 
emergency existed. In this, we respectfully submit that the 
Petition alleges no fact sufficient to confer jurisdiction on 
the Court. 
In the Johnson case this Court held that, independent 
of some emergency giving the Court jurisdiction, Juvenile 
Courts have no jurisdiction to determine fitness of parents 
to have custody of their children. But notwithstanding the 
absence of any allegation in the petition as to the fitness 
of the mother, the Court found the mother to be unfit as to 
Charlyne, R-9, but denied relief as to Sharon, R-5, T-16. 
Here we challenge the State and counsel for the Stellys to 
reconcile these inconsistent findings. By what stretch of the 
imagination can it be said that a mother is a fit person to 
have the custody of one small child and unfit to have the 
custody of the other? 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE. 
State in Interest of Johnson, 175 P. 2nd 486; 
State in Interest of Graham, 170 P. 2nd 172; 
In Re Masters, 137 N. E. 2nd 752; 
Label vs. Sullivan, 165 S. W. 2nd 639; 
In Re Knight, 31 So. 2nd 825; 
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Hydock vs. Greenberg, 79 N. Y. S. 2nd 389; 
In re Galleher, 84 P. 352. 
Assuming the petition was sufficient to justify inquiry, 
h.e evidence is totally insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 
The substance of the evidence is to the effect that the 
::~.other has been in ill health for several years prior to the 
ommencement of this proceeding and the Confidential Re-
IOrts suggest that she is mentally ill, see page 2 L. R. Roy-
ance Report and last paragraph, page 2, California Report. 
~hus, under the decisions cited above, there is no basis for 
lepriving the mother of her child on this ground. 
Assuming, but not admitting, that the Court had jur-
sdiction, it is the position of appellants that the evidence 
loes not disclose any neglect of Char lyne on the part of the 
nother. The undisputed evidence is that the mother placed 
he child with the Stellys for the purpose of adoption, T -8. 
rhough it does not appear in the Record, counsel for the 
:;tellys stated that the placement was made in his Office 
md that the mother signed a consent and waiver under oath, 
riving this child to the Stellys, CR-23. Such a consignment, 
n legal effect, is void. 
"Document signed by mother of minor child 
born out of wedlock, reciting delivery of child to 
named physician to be delivered for adoption and 
that mother would execute formal papers necessary 
and appear before Surrogate Court when required, 
was insufficient to constitute a consent to adoption 
or render mother's consent thereto unnecessary un-
der Domestic Relations Law, since named physician 
was not an authorized agency under Social Welfare 
Law to which child could be surrendered for purpose 
of adoption." Hydock vs. Greenberg, supra. 
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Syllabus 3 and 4 of the Galleher case reads as follows: 
"3. An oral agreement, by which a father gave 
his child, when six months of age, to the child's ma-
ternal aunt to raise, was revocable at the father's 
election." 
"4. In a proceeding for the appointment of a 
guardian for a child under 14 years of age, evidence 
held insufficient to warrant a finding that the child's 
father, who applied for the child's custody, had either 
deserted or abandoned the child, or that he was prof-
ligate, indolent, intemperate, and an improper per-
son to be awarded such custody." 
Utah statutes require waivers be made to licensed Child 
Welfare agencies. 
Notwithstanding the legal effect of this placement, the 
mother acted in good faith and expected that the child would 
be adopted and had no reason to suspect otherwise until 
two years later when she was hailed into court accused of 
neglect. The Stellys did not keep faith with the mother. 
They found themselves unable to adopt the child, or other-
wise provide for it, and instead of returning it to its mother, 
they, undoubtedly, sought relief from the Welfare Depart-
ment and thus brought the matter to the attention of the 
Court. During the period that the Stellys had cusody of this 
child, the mother's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Pruitt, contrib-
uted nearly $2,000.00 towards the support of these two 
children, T-16 to 18, and if there was any neglect on the par 
of any one that neglect came from the Stellys. There is n 
evidence in the entire Record showing, or tending to sho" 
that this child ever, at any time, lacked the common necess] 
ties of life. And in this v.re respectfully submit that the jud~ 
ment is contrary to the evidence. 
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POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Cases above cited; 
Hydock vs. Greenberg, 79 N.Y. S. 2nd 389. 
On October 7th the Court granted counsel access to 
the Social files for the purpose of examination, R-12, T -23. 
During the interim counsel made several calls at the Clerk's 
Office to see these reports but the Welfare Departments did 
not file them until the case was called for hearing 
December lOth at 1 :30 p. m., see reports. After Court was 
in session the Judge recessed for ten minutes to allow 
counsel an opportunity to examine the reports, T -24. On 
the morning of December lOth counsel visited the Office 
of the Welfare Department in Ogden for the purpose of 
examining these reports but was refused access to them on 
the ground that they had not been filed with the Court and 
in this we respectfully submit that such conduct did not 
allow counsel a reasonable opportunity to be prepared to 
meet the contents thereof and, therefore, constituted mis-
conduct prejudicial to the interest of appellants, and re-
versible error. 
Assuming, but not conceding, that the Court had juris-
diction, and assuming further, but not conceding, that the 
Court was justified in depriving the mother of custody, it 
is the position of appellants that the judgment is contrary 
to the best interest of the child. 
As pointed out by this Court in the Johnson case, the 
Juvenile Code is not intended as a convenient vehicle to 
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nullify the preferential rights of parents to the custody of 
their children. When the Stellys failed to carry out their 
end of the bargain and adopt this child, the right to the 
custody of that child reverted to the mother and upon learn-
ing of the ill treatment her children had received at the 
hands of the SteUys, it was her desire that her parents 
should have the children, T-9, 10. 
The grandparents filed an application with the Court, 
R-14, 15, and thus, so far as the best interest of the children 
was concerned, there was a contest between the Stelly and 
Pruitt homes. 
As between these two homes the record discloses that 
the Stellys were not able to pay the nominal expenses of 
adopting the child, CR-23. The only apparent reason for this 
case being before the Court was the inability of the Stellys 
to provide for the child. The Confidential Reports reflect 
cruel and harsh beatings inflicted on Charlyne by Mrs. 
Stelly and at T-32 it is revealed that Charlyne suffered a 
fractured hip with no explanation as to how the child hap-
pened to fall. Could the child have broken her hip in trying 
to escape a beating from Mrs. Stelly? 
The Wright report shows that Mr. Stelly was addicted 
to intoxicating liquor but suggests that he has joined the 
church and his Pastor feels that he will straighten up and 
be all right. There is nothing in the report that shows when 
Mr. Stelly joined the church or that he has, in fact, quit 
drinking liquor. Thus we may assume that he joined the 
church subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding 
for the purpose of influencing its outcome rather than con-
cern for his own soul. Another factor worthy of considera-
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tion is the fact that not once, during the entire proceedings, 
did the Stellys appear in court and present themselves for 
examination and cross-examination concerning their treat-
ment of the children and their fitness and ability to support 
them, but, like Peter, when his Lord was on trial for His 
life, they stood afar off, R-12, watching to see what hap-
pened but afraid to let their presence be known. 
On the other hand we have the Pruitts present at every 
hearing; concerned about the welfare of their grandchil-
dren; presenting themselves to the scrutiny of the Court 
and subjecting themselves to cross examination and show-
ing their stake in the support of these children and ability 
to provide for their future; they own their own home and 
contemplate buying another; they have permanent employ-
ment with a monthly income of upward of $800.00 and, if 
need be, Mrs. Pruitt is willing to give up her employment 
and devote full time to the rearing of these children and 
still have more than $500.00 monthly income. The only 
objections voiced against the Pruitts is the feeling of wel-
fare workers that they were not interested in adopting the 
children but only wished to restore them to their mother. 
Donald DeWitt, T-21, suggests that because Shirley (the 
daughter) has had her problems which her parents did not 
solve, that they, (the Pruitts) would not be able to properly 
raise these children. It does not take an expert to know, 
because it is a matter of common knowledge, that Black 
Sheep often appear in the best regulated families. These 
innuendos and insinuations are rebutted by sworn testimony 
in open court, T-30. 
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Looking at it from the standpoint of the children them-
selves, who are innocent victims of circumstances over 
which they had no control and for which they are in no way 
responsible, it is the position of appellants that the natural 
right of these children to the love, affection and welfare 
of each other, as sisters, transcends the desires, wishes and 
feelings of all the parties to this proceeding and in this we 
respectfully submit that it is the duty of the Court to respect 
the rights of these innocent children, of such tender years, 
by keeping them together in one family. As the record now 
stands before this Court it is quite apparent that the Pruitt 
home is a more suitable P.lace to subserve this purpose. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have pointed out herein the failure of the Petition 
to allege facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Juv-
enile Court; we have shown that the evidence is insufficient 
to confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court; we have shown 
that no emergency existed as contemplated by statutes, and 
wherein the judgments of the Court can not be reconciled 
with each other. As to fitness of the mother, we have· cited 
the decisions of this Court holding that the fitness of par-
ents to have the custody of their children is an issue tri-
able in courts of general jurisdiction where the parties con-
cerned may face each other face to face, introduce compe-
tent evidence, examine and cross examine witnesses and the 
court determine the issues on facts rather than assumptions, 
feelings and hearsay. We have pointed out wherein the 
interest of the children themselves was not given proper 
consideration, and in this we respectfully submit that the 
judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed and re-
manded with costs to appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
524 Beason Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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